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Evidence
by W. Randall Bassett*
Val Leppert**
and Stephen A. McCullers***
I. INTRODUCTION

The 2016 term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit' included important precedential opinions on a number of evidence topics. For example, in four cases the court considered what evidence constitutes "testimonial out-of-court statements" that are precluded by the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause unless the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant has a prior opportunity for
cross-examination. 2 The court also considered the interplay between a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an effective cross-examination
and the district court's authority to limit the scope of cross-examination. 3
The court issued two published opinions of importance regarding the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination: one addressed
whether a defendant's pre-Miranda silence may be used as substantive
*Partnerin the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The Citadel (B.S., 1989);
University of Georgia School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 1992). Member, State Bars of Georgia
and Florida.
-Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Westminster College
(B.A. 2004); Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude,
2010). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Florida.
*Associate in the firm of King & Spalding LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Clemson University
(B.S., 2005); University of Florida (M.S., 2008); University of Florida, Levin College of Law
(J.D., magna cum laude, 2013). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For an analysis of evidence law during the prior survey period, see W. Randall Bassett, Val Leppert & Stephen A. McCullers, Evidence, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 67 MERCER
L. REv. 907 (2016).
2. United States v. Hughes, 840 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2016); Thomas v. Sec'y, Fla.
Dep't of Corr., 643 F. App'x 827 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Ramirez, 658 F. App'x
949 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Bates, 665 F. App'x 810 (11th Cir. 2016).
3. See Cadet v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 521 (2016); United States v. Rushin, 844 F.3d
933, 938 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Castronuovo, 649 F. App'x 904 (11th Cir. 2016).
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evidence of guilt; 4 the other considered the issue of first impression of
whether a public employee may waive Fifth Amendment protections,
which would allow statements made during an investigation to be used
in a subsequent criminal case. 5
Regarding the admissibility of expert opinions, in the 2016 term the
Eleventh Circuit continued the apparent trend (discussed in last year's

evidence survey)6 of more closely scrutinizing exclusions of expert evidence. Similar to previous years, the circuit court affirmed four out of the
five expert evidence cases it considered, 7 with the single reversal being a
case where the district court excluded the plaintiffs primary expert evidence and then granted summary judgment for the defendant.8
The Eleventh Circuit also issued two published opinions addressing
matters of first impression regarding the Federal Rules of Evidence's prohibition on character evidence. In one case involving a defendant's claim
that he was entrapped by the government in a charge of coercing an underage girl into prostitution, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant should have been allowed to introduce evidence of specific conduct to
rebut the government's claim that he was predisposed to seek out sex
with minors.9 In another case of first impression, the court held that a
conviction following a nolo contendere plea does not provide sufficient evidence such that it may be admitted to show the defendant committed a
"prior bad act" under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.1 0 This
Survey of the Eleventh Circuit's 2016 evidence opinions provides a concise summary of all of these rulings and provides the practitioner with a
succinct overview of the most important evidence rulings by the Eleventh

Circuit in 2016.

4. United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016).
5. United States v. Smith, 821 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016).
6. Bassett et al., supra note 1, at 915.
7. Arthur v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d 1268, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016); Alsip
v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 658 F. App'x 944, 948 (11th Cir. 2016); Witt v. Stryker Corp. of
Mich., 648 F. App'x 867, 874 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Johnson, 664 F. App'x 785,
788 (11th Cir. 2016).
8. Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., 813 F.3d 983, 991 (11th Cir. 2016).
9. United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2016).
10. United States v. Green, 842 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2016).
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II. CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY PRINCIPLES

A. The ConfrontationClause
The Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution"1 guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy . . . the right to be confronted with the witnesses
1
against him." 12 Interpreting the Clause in Crawford v. Washington,' the
Supreme Court of the United States held that it bars the admission of
"[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial," unless "the declarant is unavailable" and the defendant "had a prior opportunity to
cross-examine" the declarant.1 4 Since Crawford, the courts have tried to
define when an out-of-court statement is "testimonial" and thus implicates the Clause. Generally speaking, testimonial statements are those
5
that a declarant "would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially."1
For example, "formal statements to government officers . . . affidavits,
custodial examinations, [and] prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine."1 6 To determine whether statements are testimonial, courts often examine whether the "primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later
7
criminal prosecution."1
During the 2016 term, the Eleventh Circuit applied the primary-purpose test in United States v. Hughes,'8 where a jury convicted the defend9
ant of being a felon in possession of a firearm.' A key piece of the gov20
ernment's case was a Computer-Aided Dispatch (CAD) report
containing statements by a 911 caller that the defendant was wielding a
gun while standing outside a bar. 21 The defendant contended that the
Confrontation Clause barred the admission of the CAD report because it

11. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
12. Id.
13. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
14. Id. at 59 ("Testimonial statements of witnesses absent from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the defendant has had a prior
opportunity to cross-examine.").
15. Id. at 51.
16. United States v. Caraballo, 595 F.3d 1214, 1228 (11th Cir. 2010) (internal punctuation marks omitted; alterations adopted).
17. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
18. 840 F.3d 1368 (11th Cir. 2016).
19. Id. at 1377.
20. A CAD report is generated by the "Computer-Aided Dispatch" system and is intended to relay information contained in 911 calls to responding officers. See id. at 1373,
1384.
21. Id. at 1373.
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included testimonial statements made by the caller and the caller was
not available for cross-examination at trial. 22 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed because "the testimony at trial established that the primary purpose of a CAD report ordinarily is 'to provide information to the officers
who are responding in the field in realtime to allow them to address whatever ongoing emergency is being reported."' 23 In other words, the purpose
of the 911 call was to address an ongoing emergency - not to prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecutions. 24 The CAD report thus did not implicate the Confrontation Clause. 25
In three unpublished opinions, the Eleventh Circuit also had to determine whether certain statements were testimonial and thus barred by
the Confrontation Clause absent an opportunity for cross-examination of

the declarant. In Thomas v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections,26 the court concluded that conversations between a husband and

his wife were not testimonial because they were private in nature and
thus not the type of statements one "would reasonably expect to be used
at trial." 27 The court reached the same conclusion in United States v.
Ramirez 28 with respect to private conversations between a man and his
fiance. However, the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite result in
United States v. Bates,29 where the government introduced child pornography investigation reports as evidence against a defendant charged with
possessing and distributing child pornography. 30 Because these reports
"relied on input from law enforcement officers" and were "made under
circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial,"3 they
were testimonial and their introduction into evidence violated the Confrontation Clause. 32

22. Id. at 1383.
23. Id. at 1384.
24. See id.
25. Id.
26. 643 F. App'x 827 (11th Cir. 2016).
27. Id. at 829.
28. 658 F. App'x 949, 954 (11th Cir. 2016).
29. No. 15-14395, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21275 (11th Cir. Nov. 29, 2016).
30. Id. at *2-3.
31. Id. at *7-8 (quotation marks omitted).
32. Id. at *8. The Eleventh Circuit, however, did not reverse for a new trial, having
concluded that the erroneous introduction of the reports was harmless. Id. In United States
v. Cruickshank, the Eleventh Circuit briefly noted that the Confrontation Clause does not
apply to a "United States State Department certification of jurisdiction" under the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act "because it does not affect the guilt or innocence of a defendant." 837 F.3d 1182, 1191 (11th Cir. 2016).
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Besides barring the introduction of testimonial out-of-court statements, the Confrontation Clause also guarantees the defendant's right to
conduct a cross-examination that is effective enough to (1) expose the jury
"to facts sufficient for it to draw inferences relating to the reliability of
th[e] witness" and (2) enable the defendant "to make a record from which
he could argue why the witness might have been biased." 33 That right is
not absolute; instead, it is subject to the trial court's reasonable limitations on the scope of cross-examination "based on concerns about, among
other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'
safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." 34
To balance these concerns with the defendant's right to an effective crossexamination, courts should consider "whether a reasonable jury would
have received a significantly different impression of a witness' credibility
had counsel pursued the proposed line of cross-examination." 35
Several cases during the 2016 term required the Eleventh Circuit to
address the interplay between the defendant's right to an effective crossexamination on the one hand and the trial court's authority to control the
scope of cross-examination on the other hand. In United States v.
Rushin,36 the court faced these competing considerations in the context
of the defendant seeking to question witnesses about the sentences they
37
may have received if they had not cooperated with the government.
While the district court allowed the defendant to establish that the cooperating witnesses were all receiving significantly reduced sentences as a
result of their plea bargains, it precluded questions concerning the precise number of years of prison time the witnesses may have received
without the plea bargain. 38
The Eleventh Circuit found the district court's limitation reasonable
and consistent with the Confrontation Clause. 39 Because the permitted
cross-examination established the witnesses' biases and motivations for
testifying favorably to the government, questions concerning the exact
number of years of prison time would have added little probative value
and, instead, would have potentially (1) invited jury nullification (because the questions would have alerted the jurors to the sentence the

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

United States v. Rushin, 844 F.3d 933, 938 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 938 (quotation marks omitted).
United States v. Garcia, 13 F.3d 1464, 1469 (11th Cir. 1994).
844 F.3d 933 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 937-38.
Id. at 939.
See id.
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defendant was facing) and (2) lead to "confusing and convoluted 'minitrials' on the issue of sentencing alone."40
In United States v. Castronuovo, 41 a case involving an illegal "pill mill"
operation, the Eleventh Circuit also concluded that the district court's
limitations on the defendant's cross-examination were reasonable and
did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 42 The defendant sought to question a key player in the pill mill scheme about his tattoo and about racial
slurs he had used, but the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
prohibition of these questions because the defendant had already conducted a thorough cross-examination of this witness and the proposed
questions concerning the tattoos and the racial slurs "would not have provided a significantly different impression of his credibility." 4 3

B. The PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
More commonly known as the right against self-incrimination, the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United StateS 44 provides that
"[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself .. . ."45 During the 2016 term, the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals issued two published opinions discussing the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The first, United States v. Wilchcombe, 46 considered a circuit split regarding whether a suspect's pre-Miranda silence can be used as substantive evidence of their guilt. 47 The
second, United States v. Smith,48 considered, as a matter of first impression, whether an employee who has been fired can voluntarily waive his
Fifth Amendment protection and allow previously compelled and protected statements to be used against him in an investigation.4 9
As portrayed on countless TV police dramas, the Mirandawarning informs a suspect under police custody of their Fifth Amendment right to
40. Id. at 939-40.
41. 649 F. App'x 904 (11th Cir. 2016).
42. Id. at 924.
43. Id. In two additional unpublished (and rather unremarkable) opinions, the Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court's limitations on the defendant's cross-examination, noting in both cases that the defendant's failure to preserve the alleged error meant
that the issue was reviewed only for plain error. See United States v. Underwood, 654 F.
App'x 403, 406 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Williams, 665 F. App'x 780, 783-84 (11th
Cir. 2016).
44. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
45. Id.
46. 838 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016).

47. See id.
48. 821 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016).
49. See id.
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remain silent. The Mirandawarning stems from the United States Supreme Court opinion Miranda v. Arizona,5 0 where the Court held that
Fifth Amendment protection requires the prosecution to "demonstrate[]
the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against
self-incrimination" before using at trial a defendant's statements "stemming from custodial interrogation."5 1 The Supreme Court has also ruled,
however, "that it is constitutionally permissible to use a suspect's postarrest," but "pre-Mirandasilence to impeach a defendant." 52 During the
2016 term, the Eleventh Circuit considered its precedent and an ongoing
circuit split on a slightly different issue: whether the government may
use a defendant's pre-Miranda silence as direct evidence to prove the
guilt of the defendant. 53
United States v. Wilchcombe 54 involved charges against multiple defendants for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine and
marijuana aboard a vessel subject to United States jurisdiction.55 The
case involved a plan to transport by boat cocaine and marijuana from
Haiti to the Bahamas. Unfortunately for the defendants, their boat was
spotted by the U.S. Coast Guard and, after a brief chase, the Coast Guard
detained the defendants and recovered the drugs which had been thrown
overboard during the chase. The defendants were detained for a few days
aboard the Coast Guard vessel, but were not interrogated, did not ask to
speak privately with any Coast Guard official, and were not read their
Mirandarights.5 6 At trial, only one defendant testified. He claimed that
he and another defendant had been tricked and then forced at gunpoint
to participate in the drug run.5 7 To refute this testimony, the government
introduced evidence of the defendants' silence after they were detained;
the argument being that, if they had indeed been forced to help smuggle
the drugs, they would have sought help from the Coast Guard after they
were captured.55 The jury agreed with the government, and the defendants were convicted on all charges. 5 9

50. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 444.
United States v. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d 1179, 1190 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1179.
838 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1183.
Id. at 1184-85.
Id. at 1185.
Id. at 1190.
Id. at 1185.
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On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the two defendants argued that
the district court erred by not declaring a mistrial due to the government's comments at trial regarding the defendants' silence after they
were in custody.60 After a review of its precedent and other case law, the
Eleventh Circuit noted that whether pre-Mirandaevidence could be used
as substantive evidence of guilt had not been considered by the Supreme
Court and the other Circuits' precedent varies greatly. 61 The United
States Courts of Appeal for the First, Second, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits
prohibit the use of any pre-arrest silence as evidence of the defendant's
guilt. 62 In contrast, the United States Courts of Appeal for the Ninth,
Tenth, and D.C. Circuits prohibit the use of post-arrest, but pre-Miranda,
silence as substantive evidence. 63 Finally, the United States Courts of
Appeal for the Fourth and Eighth Circuits allow the use of pre-Miranda
silence as the district court did in this case.64 As for the Eleventh Circuit,
it falls in this latter category, and in its prior decision United States v.
Rivera,6 5 it held that the "government may comment on a defendant's
silence when it occurs after arrest, but before Miranda warnings are
given."6 6 Despite the disagreement among the Circuit Courts on this is-

sue, the Eleventh Circuit followed its prior precedent and held that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial
based on the government's use of the defendants' silence as proof of
guilt.6 7 While the prior Rivera decision may have controlled the outcome
of this case, two of the judges participated in a concurring opinion stating
that the legal reasoning behind Rivera was "misguided and should be reconsidered en banc in an appropriate case."68 Thus, considering the Circuit split and the disagreement among Eleventh Circuit judges on this
issue, it appears the question of whether pre-Miranda silence may be
used as substantive evidence of guilt is far from settled.

60. Id. at 1189.
61. Id. at 1190.
62. Id. (citing United States v. Okatan, 728 F.3d 111, 120 (2d Cir. 2013); Ouska v. Cahill-Masching, 246 F.3d 1036, 1049 (7th Cir. 2001); Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 560
(6th Cir. 2000); Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir. 1989)).
63. Id. (citing United States v. Hernandez, 476 F.3d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1997); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196,
1200-01 (10th Cir. 1991)).
64. Id. (citing United States v. Cornwell, 418 F. App'x 224, 227 (4th Cir. 2011); United
States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2005)).
65. 944 F.2d 1563 (11th Cir. 1991).
66. Wilchcombe, 838 F.3d at 1190 (quoting Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568).
67. Id. at 1191.
68. Id. at 1193 (Jordan, J., concurring).
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In another opinion regarding the Fifth Amendment right against selfincrimination, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Smith69 considered a public employee's waiver of Garrity rights. Under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Garrityv. New Jersey,70 "a public employee may
not be coerced into surrendering his Fifth Amendment privilege by threat
of being fired or subjected to other sanctions."7 1 Thus, if the government
threatens an employee with firing unless the employee participates in an
internal investigation, the employee's statements may not be used
against the employee in a later criminal case. 72
The facts of Smith involved a police lieutenant's role in the death of a
prison inmate. The male inmate got into a fight with a female police officer, and after the fight had been broken up and the inmate placed in
cuffs, the lieutenant and some other officers beat the inmate repeatedly.
The beating continued to the prison hospital, where the lieutenant ordered the nurses to leave the room and then proceeded to continue the
beating. When the nurses returned, they found the inmate unresponsive
with severe brain swelling, multiple facial fractures, and a ruptured
spleen. The inmate died the next day from blunt force trauma and traumatic brain injury. 73 During the investigations that inevitably followed,
the lieutenant lied to various state law enforcement and investigation
agencies by saying his use of force was necessary and that the head injuries the inmate suffered were from falling off the hospital bed, not from
the police officers. Shortly thereafter, the lieutenant was fired by the
state.74
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) eventually launched a criminal investigation into the death, the various state investigations were
closed, and the investigation files were sent to the FBI. During the FBI's
interview of the now-former police lieutenant, the FBI informed the lieutenant that the agency had received the states' files, including prior
statements by the lieutenant, but the FBI had not yet reviewed because
they had likely been compelled under threat of termination. The FBI
wanted to review the prior statements and the lieutenant to waive his
Garrity rights. The FBI explained that under Garrity the prior statements of the lieutenant could not be used in the FBI's investigation without a waiver. The lieutenant agreed to waive his rights, claiming that the

69. 821 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2016).
70. 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
71. Smith, 821 F.3d at 1296 (quoting United States v. Vangates, 287 F.3d 1315, 1320
(11th Cir. 2002)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1296-97.
74. Id. at 1297-98.
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prior statements were consistent with the account he gave the FBI. The
lieutenant then signed a waiver form. 75 Following the investigation, a
federal grand jury indicted the lieutenant on multiple federal charges related to the beating and death of the inmate.76 Before trial, the lieutenant
moved to suppress the statements he gave to the state investigation
agencies, claiming that they had been compelled and used in the FBI investigation in violation of his Garrity rights.77 The district court denied
the lieutenant's motion to suppress and a jury convicted the lieutenant
on all charges. 78
On appeal before the Eleventh Circuit, the lieutenant argued the district court erred in allowing his statements during the state's investigations to be used against him. As a matter of first impression, the court
held, that like other Fifth Amendment rights, Garrity protections may be
waived if the waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently.79 Here, the lieutenant's waiver was voluntary because the meeting with the FBI agents was consensual and there was no evidence of
threat or coercion on the part of the agents.8 0 Moreover, the waiver was
knowing and intelligent because the lieutenant knew what rights he was
giving up and was informed of the consequences of the waiver.8 1 Thus,
the district court did not err in admitting the lieutenant's prior statements. 82
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY

Federal courts assess the admissibility of expert opinion testimony under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.8 3 Pursuant to that rule,
the proponent of the evidence bears the burden of showing that (1) the
expert is qualified to testify competently regarding the matters she intends to address; (2) the methodology by which the expert reaches her
conclusions is sufficiently reliable; and (3) the testimony assists the trier

75. Id. at 1299-1300.
76. Id. at 1300.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1301.
79. Id. at 1304 (citing Colorado v. Springs, 479 U.S. 564, 573 (1987) (holding Fifth
Amendment rights may be waived); United States v. Gray, No. 3:09CR182, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50230, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2010) (holding that police officers waived their
Garrity rights during a FBI interview)).
80. Id. at 1305.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 1306.
83. FED. R. EvID. 702.
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of fact, through the application of scientific, technical, or specialized expertise, to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.8 Interpreting Rule 702 in the seminal case of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,85 the Supreme Court emphasized that district courts must
perform a "gatekeeping" function before they can admit expert testimony. 6 Given that an expert's opinion "can be both powerful and quite
misleading because of the difficulty in evaluating it,"87 district judges
must "conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of expert opinions" 8 8 to ensure "that an expert, whether basing testimony upon profes-

sional studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same
level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in
the relevant field."8 9
In performing the Rule 702 gatekeeping function, district judges enjoy
"considerable leeway,"w which means that appellate courts apply the
abuse of discretion standard and can reverse only when the ruling is
"manifestly erroneous."9 1 As outlined in last year's survey, the Eleventh
Circuit has generally applied this deferential standard of review, affirming over seventy percent of all Daubert rulings since The beginning of this
decade. 92 It is worth noting that the Eleventh Circuit has affirmed every
ruling admitting expert evidence over a Daubert objection in the last
seven years. 93 But, as also discussed in last year's survey, "rulings ex94
cluding expert evidence have ostensibly received greater scrutiny." All
six cases reversing a Daubertruling since 2010 involved the lower court's
exclusion of expert evidence.9 5 In all six of those cases, the lower courts

84. United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc); City of
Tuscaloosa v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998).
85. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
86. Id. at 589 n.7.
87. Id. at 595.
88. Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1260 (quotation marks omitted).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1258-59.
91. Id. at 1259.
92. Bassett et al., supra note 1, at 915.
93. Id. One possible exception to this pattern was United States v. Harrell, where the
Eleventh Circuit found the district court abused its discretion in allowing a detective to
testify as an expert, but that the error was harmless. 751 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2014).
94. Bassett et al., supra note 1, at 915.
95. Seamon v. Remington Arms Co., 813 F.3d 983, 991 (11th Cir. 2016); Sorrels v. NCL
(Bahamas) Ltd., 796 F.3d 1275, 1279 (11th Cir. 2015); Adams v. Lab. Corp. of Am., 760 F.3d
1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 2014); United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Whirlpool Corp., 704 F.3d 1338, 1343
(11th Cir. 2013); United States v. Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d 1278, 1288 (11th Cir. 2013);
Rosenfeld v. Oceania Cruises, Inc., 654 F.3d 1190, 1194 (11th Cir. 2011).
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had excluded a plaintiffs key expert testimony, resulting in either a summary judgment9 6 or a jury verdict for the defendant. 9
The Eleventh Circuit's 2016 term continued the court's apparent trend
of more closely scrutinizing exclusions of expert evidence. Just like the
2015 term,98 the court again affirmed four out of five Daubert rulings,99
with the lone reversal once more coming in a civil case in which the district court had excluded the plaintiffs key expert testimony and then
granted summary judgment to the defendant. 100 Seamon v. Remington
Arms Co.,101 is a good place to start this year's Survey. In Seamon, the
plaintiff brought a wrongful death action against a rifle manufacturer,
alleging that a defect in the trigger system caused her husband's hunting
rifle to unexpectedly fire a shot that killed the husband while deer hunting.1 02 There were no witnesses to the incident; the husband was found
dead in a tree stand with his left hand "clenched around the front rail of
his tree stand, while his right hand was positioned as if he had been
grasping something." 0 The rifle was found on the ground thirteen feet
below the stand, with a rope "wrapped around the rifle's scope and
safety."104 According to the responding officers, "[t]he rifle's safety mechanism was off, there was a spent cartridge casing in the rifle's chamber,
and there was no gunshot residue" on the husband's body or clothing,
leading the "officers to conclude that the rifle was at least five to ten feet
away" from the husband when it fired. 0 5
The plaintiff's liability expert, Dr. Charles Powell, opined that the rifle
fired unexpectedly due to a design defect; more specifically, "interferences with the fire control components produced inadequate sear-connector engagement and allowed the ... rifle to release the firing pin and
fire the . . . rifle without any interaction with the trigger." 0 6 Dr. Powell
further believed that "the firing may have been spurred by a 'jar-off'-

96. Seamon, 813 F.3d at 991; Sorrels, 796 F.3d at 1279; Adams, 760 F.3d at 1336;
United Fire & Cas. Co., 704 F.3d at 1343; Ala. Power Co., 730 F.3d at 1288.
97. Rosenfeld, 654 F.3d at 1194.
98. See Bassett et al., supranote 1, at 915.
99. The four affirmed rulings were Arthur v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr., 840 F.3d
1268, 1312 (11th Cir. 2016); Alsip v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, 658 F. App'x 944, 948 (11th
Cir. 2016); Witt v. Stryker Corp. of Mich., 648 F. App'x 867, 876 (11th Cir. 2016); United
States v. Johnson, 664 F. App'x 785 (11th Cir. 2016).
100. Seamon, 813 F.3d at 991.
101. Id. at. 986.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 985-86.
104. Id. at 985.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 987.
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meaning that the rifle contacted an external force like the tree, rope, or
ground, and the connector was further jarred out of position, allowing the
rifle to fire."1 0 7 The district court excluded Dr. Powell's opinion as unreli-

able because "(1) Powell had not adequately accounted for possible alternative causes of the shooting; and (2) Powell had formed his opinions
08
based upon facts not in the record."
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that both of the dis09
As to Dr. Powell's
trict court's conclusions were manifestly erroneous.
that he adefound
Circuit
treatment of alternative causes, the Eleventh
by the deproffered
quately considered and rejected the possible causes
someone
or
husband
fense-namely that the rifle fired because either the
there
that
noted
Powell
Dr.
else pulled the trigger.110 At his deposition,
the
fact,
In
case.
this
in
was no "evidence that the trigger was pulled
or
lowered
raised
being
was
evidence is just to the contrary, that the rifle
at the time and it went off.""'1 The Eleventh Circuit found that the record
supported Dr. Powell's conclusion because (1) "[t]he lack of gunshot residue" on the husband "suggests that he did not pull the trigger himself";
(2) "[t]he position of his body-his left hand grasping the tree stand, his
right hand positioned as if it were grasping the rope-suggests that
someone else did not come along and pull the trigger, but rather that he
was in the process of raising or lowering the rifle"; (3) "[t]he position of
the rope-wrapped around the scope and the safety-also suggests that
the rope did not pull the trigger"; and (4) "there appeared to be no
branches or other objects which could have caught the trigger between
12
the tree stand and the ground."1
As to the district court's conclusion that Dr. Powell's opinion lacked
factual support in the record, the Eleventh Circuit noted that while there
was no direct evidence of a jar off, the "evidence here is inconsistent with
the defendant's theory (a trigger pull) and fully consistent with Powell's
jar-off theory."" 3 Thus, it was reasonable (and not speculative) for Dr.
Powell "to infer that a jar off occurred."1 14 In that same vein, the appellate
court stated that even if the district court had correctly concluded that
the defendant's trigger-pull theory was equally plausible as Dr. Powell's

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id.
Id. at 989.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 990.
Id.
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jar-off theory, it still would not have presented grounds to strike Dr. Powell's opinion: "Once an expert opinion has satisfied Daubert, a court may
not exclude the opinion simply because it believes that the opinion is not
- in its view - particularly strong or persuasive. The weight to be given
to admissible expert testimony is a matter for the jury."115
The Eleventh Circuit also rejected the district court's conclusion "that
Powell 'was unable to replicate a jar-off in his testing and inspection of
the subject rifle."'116 The record revealed that Dr. Powell did not attempt
to conduct a jar-off test "because by the time he received the rifle, the
sear engagement was not low enough to necessitate such a test."1 7 More
important, "the fact that the sear engagement was safe at the time of
Powell's examination does not prove that it was also safe before the rifle
fired, because the placement of the sear would necessarily be different
before and after the rifle fired."118 Therefore, the district court clearly
erred when it effectively drew "an adverse inference from the alleged failure of Powell's testing, when he did not conduct that test in the first place
because the condition of the sear engagement would have made it a fruitless enterprise."" 9
Likewise, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the district court's conclusion that Dr. Powell had "no evidence of interferences causing a precipitously low sear engagement at the time the rifle fired."1 20 While it was
"simply impossible to know the precise positioning of the sear in the moments before the rifle fired," the Eleventh Circuit pointed out that Dr.
Powell "did find debris in the fire control housing-the type of debris that
he previously has observed interfering with the sear engagement in the
same type of rifle." 121 Given that the "evidence also suggests the trigger

was not pulled and the only other possibility is that the rifle fired without
a trigger pull," the appellate court stated that "it does not require 'a metaphysical process' to infer that the debris in the fire control housing created the condition (a precipitous sear engagement) that would have allowed the rifle to fire upon being jarred." 122 The district court therefore
manifestly erred when it concluded that Dr. Powell's opinion was unsupported by the record.1 23 Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 991.
Id.
Id.
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lower court's Daubert ruling and the grant of summary judgment that
was based on it. 124
Besides the district court's exclusion of Dr. Powell's opinion in Seamon,
the Eleventh Circuit affirmed all Daubert rulings in the 2016 term. The
only other published opinion was Arthur v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections,125 a section 1983126 suit brought by a death row
inmate alleging that Alabama's use of midazolam in its three-drug lethal
127
Among
injection protocol violated various constitutional provisions.
midazolam
of
mg
500
of
"use
other claims, the inmate contended that the
will cause him uniquely to suffer a heart attack a few minutes before full
sedation." 128 To support that allegation, the inmate proffered the testi129
but the district court exmony of his expert cardiologist, Dr. Strader,
130
unreliable.
and
cluded his opinion as speculative
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the lower court's ruling was within its discretion.131 After noting that Dr. Strader's opinion
was basically "a house of cards" built on a number of dubious assumptions, 132 the appellate court focused on Dr. Strader's "time-gap" theorymore specifically, that a 500-mg dose of midazolam would likely cause
the inmate to suffer from a heart attack within one to two minutes of
administration while sedation would likely not occur until three to five
minutes after administration. 133 As an initial matter, the court pointed
out that Dr. Strader's analysis conflates sedation with anesthesia. 134 He
overlooked that (1) sedation is not the same as anesthesia and (2) the
State of Alabama's lethal injection protocol uses midazolam for the purpose of anesthesia-not sedation. 135 While Dr. Strader could perhaps
rely on his practical experience to opine about the time needed for sedation with midazolam, he knew preciously little about how long the anesthetic process would take. 136 The drug's package insert states that sedation may take three to five minutes (which is consistent with Dr.
Strader's opinion) but then notes that "use of midazolam as an anesthetic
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id.
840 F.3d 1268 (11th Cir. 2016).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
Arthur, 840 F.3d at 1268.
Id. at 1308-09.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1310.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1311.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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induction agent can take as little as 2 minutes without narcotic premedication."137 Because Dr. Strader based his time-gap theory on the time
needed to reach sedation, it was not a reliable methodology to predict the
time needed to reach anesthesia-a distinct concept and the purpose for
which the State intends to use the drug. 138
Confirming that Dr. Strader's opinion was unreliable, the court
pointed to his lack of understanding of midazolam's dose response.1 39 Dr.
Strader's time-gap estimates were based on extrapolations from his clinical use of 2-5 mg of midazolam on his patients-but the State of Alabama's protocol seeks to administer 500 mg of the drug on the inmate.140
When Dr. Strader was questioned about "how long it would take to render a patient unconscious using a 500-mg dose of midazolam, he was
never able to provide an answer, acknowledging that this was 'outside
his realm of practice."'141 While an expert may generally extrapolate conclusions from existing data, the Eleventh Circuit explained that "there
must be some basis for that extrapolation."1 42 Here, Dr. Strader just "did
not have sufficient information to extrapolate from," which rendered his
methodology unreliable under Daubert and his opinion inadmissible under Rule 702.143
The remaining Daubert rulings in the 2016 term were all addressed in
unpublished opinions, meaning that they constitute only persuasive authority in future cases. In Alsip v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP,144 the plaintiff brought an action for personal injury arising from an accident in
which she "slipped on a crosswalk in the Wal-Mart parking lot during a
rain shower."14 5 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's exclusion of the plaintiffs expert's opinion "that the Wal-Mart crosswalk
stripes were not slip resistant in accordance with industry standards."146
As the expert candidly conceded, he did not "know the actual slip resistance of the crosswalk stripes at the time of [the] accident," and the
only way to determine slip resistance "is to conduct a precise, contemporaneous test," which he did not perform.14 7 The expert's own testimony

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id.
See id. at 1311-12.
Id. at 1312.
Id. at 1311.
Id. at 1312.
Id.
Id.
658 F. App'x 944 (11th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 945.
Id. at 945, 947.
Id. at 948.
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thus established that his opinion was "based on flawed reasoning and
speculation." 148

The Eleventh Circuit also affirmed the district court's exclusion of the
149
plaintiffs expert in Witt v. Stryker Corp. of Michigan, a products liability action asserting that the defendant had defectively designed the
plaintiffs prosthetic knee implant which allegedly caused her to suffer
severe pain and required several follow-up surgeries. 150 Neither the expert's "terse" report nor his subsequent deposition testimony explained
why the implant's device was defective; indeed, he disclaimed having any
expert opinion on that topic.151 The district court therefore acted within
its discretion when it "determined that this expert opinion lacked any
explanation, foundation, or support, and therefore had to be excluded be52
cause of its unreliability."1
IV. NON-CONSTITUTIONAL EVIDENTIARY ISSUES

A. CharacterEvidence - BalancingRelevance and Unfair Prejudice
In general, the Federal Rules of Evidence consider all relevant evidence admissible at trial. 5 s The Rules define relevant evidence broadly
as any evidence that "has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 5 4 As always, there are exceptions to this rule. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 excludes the admission of relevant evidence where "its probative value is substantially
outweighed by .. . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence." 5 5 When assessing whether the unfair prejudice of evidence sub-

148. Id.
149. 648 F. App'x 867 (11th Cir. 2016).

150. Id. at 869.
151. Id. at 873.
152. Id. The final Daubert ruling in the court's 2016 term was unremarkable and thus
merits little discussion. In United States v. Johnson, 664 F. App'x 785 (11th Cir. 2016), the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with lower court that the government had sufficiently established
that a police detective was sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert. Id. at 787.
153. FED. R. EVID. 402; see also United States v. Langford, 647 F.3d 1309, 1323 (11th
Cir. 2011).
154. FED. R. EvID. 401.
155. FED. R. EVID. 403; see, e.g., Fucron v. Mail Ctrs. Plus, LLC, 843 F.3d 1295, 1309
(11th Cir. 2016) (discussing the admission of cumulative "me too" evidence to prove intent
to discriminate and retaliation in sexual harassment cases).
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stantially outweighs its relevance, the trial court must find that the evidence has "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." 156
Federal Rule of Evidence 404157 addresses a specific type of potentially
prejudicial evidence - character evidence - by prohibiting evidence of
a person's character or character trait to "prove that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character or trait." 15 8 In
the criminal context, the prohibition on character evidence cuts both
ways: the government is generally prohibited from introducing character
evidence to show the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime;
and the defendant is barred from presenting evidence of good conduct in
an attempt to negate criminal intent.159 Similarly, Rule 404 also prohibits evidence of "prior bad acts" by prohibiting the admission of evidence
"of a crime, wrong, or other act .

.

. to prove a person's character in order

to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with
the character."16 0 Such evidence, however, is admissible for other purposes, including "proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident." 161
Due to the prejudicial nature of character and prior bad act evidence,
Rule 404 is a hotly argued issue at trial and often presents new questions
for the Circuit Court of Appeals to consider. The 2016 term of the Eleventh Circuit was no different, with the court addressing two issues of first
impression. 162
In United States v. Rutgerson,163 the Eleventh Circuit considered for
the first time "whether a defendant who has raised an entrapment defense may present evidence of specific conduct to show a lack of predisposition to commit the charged crime."164 The Rutgerson case involved a

156. FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee's note to 1972 amendment.
157. FED. R. EvID. 404.
158. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(1).
159. See, e.g., United States v. Brannan, 562 F.3d 1300, 1308 (11th Cir. 2009); United
States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1270-71 (11th Cir. 2008).
160. FED. R. EvID. 404(b)(1).
161. FED. R. EVID. 404(b)(2); see, e.g., United States v. Barron-Soto, 820 F.3d 409, 417
(11th Cir. 2016) (in a case involving charges of conspiracy to distribute and possess methamphetamine, holding the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of
prior drug offenses to show intent, despite the dissimilarities in the drug type, drug amount,
and transportation method between those prior crimes and the current charge).
162. United States v. Rutgerson, 822 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Green,
842 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2016).
163. 822 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2016).
164. Id. at 1239.
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charge of attempting to coerce a minor to engage in prostitution or unlawful sex. 165 The defendant visited an internet site used by prostitutes
and their clients to arrange meetings. There, the defendant responded to
a post by "Amberly," who described herself as a "young lady."1 66 Unbeknownst to the defendant, Amberly was a fictitious character invented
by the Fort Lauderdale Police Department.16 7 Over the next few days, the
defendant and Amberly made arrangements to meet, including setting
prices and what sexual acts would be performed. On multiple occasions,
Amberly stated that she was only fifteen years old and used other code
words and phrases which, in the world of online solicitation, are used to
identify an underage prostitute.168 Undeterred by Amberly's youth as
long as they were "discrete," the defendant drove to a Fort Lauderdale
hotel where, instead of finding a young lady, he found police officers waiting to arrest him. 169

At trial, the defendant argued he should not be convicted because he
was entrapped by the government to commit the crime. 170 Entrapment is
an affirmative defense which requires a defendant to show that the government induced the crime and that the accused lacked the predisposition to commit the crime absent the government inducement. 171 To show
he lacked the predisposition to coerce a minor into engaging in prostitution, the defendant sought to introduce testimony from a detective who,
after significant investigation, found no indication that the defendant
had ever visited a website regarding sex with minors. 172 The district court
excluded this evidence and the defendant appealed after the jury found
him guilty. 173
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit considered when character evidence
may be admitted at trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 405(b)174 allows the
admission of character evidence "[w]hen a person's character or character
trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense."175 In the case
of an entrapment defense, once the defendant raises the defense, Rule
405(b) allows the government to introduce evidence of specific conduct to

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id. at 1227.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1228-29.
Id. at 1228, 1230.
Id. at 1234.
Id.; United States v. Ryan, 289 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002).
Rutgerson, 822 F.3d at 1238.
Id. at 1231.
FED. R. EVID. 405(b).
Rutgerson, 822 F.3d at 1239 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 405(b)).
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show the defendant was predisposed to commit the crime.1 76 Here, to
show the defendant was predisposed to induce minors to have sex with
him, the government presented evidence that the defendant had
searched online for "young" prostitutes and had contacted those prostitutes. 177 As a matter of first impression, the question before the Eleventh
Circuit was whether the defendant could introduce evidence of specific
conduct to show he lacked the predisposition to commit the crime. 7 8
The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion
in not allowing the defendant to introduce this evidence. 7 9 Once the defendant raised the entrapment defense, the defendant's predisposition to
commit the crime was an essential element at issue. Evidence of the fact
that the defendant had not visited any websites dedicated to sex with
underage women would have been relevant to this issue as rebuttal to
the government's predisposition evidence. 80 Thus, the district court
should have allowed the defendant to present this evidence.' 8
Moving to evidence of prior bad acts, the Eleventh Circuit also considered an issue of first impression in United States v. Green.182 Evidence of
a prior bad act is only admissible if it (1) is relevant to an issue other
than a defendant's character; (2) the preponderance of the evidence
shows that the defendant committed the bad act; and, (3) the evidence
passes the Rule 403 test in that its probative value is not outweighed by
the risk of unfair prejudice.1 83 In Green, the court considered whether a
prior conviction based on a nolo contendere plea provided sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that the
defendant committed the crime for purposes of evidence of a prior bad
act.1 84 The defendant in the case had been charged with various state
crimes and was required to wear a Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring bracelet while on pre-trial release. 85 At some point the GPS

176. Id.
177. Id. at 1240.
178. Id. at 1239.
179. Id. at 1240.
180. Id.
181. Id. The Eleventh Circuit, however, found that the district court's error was harmless because, even if the evidence had been admitted, it would not have overcome the significant evidence presented by the government that the defendant was predisposed to commit the charged crime. Id. at 1241.
182. 842 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2016).
183. United States v. Miller, 959 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
184. Green, 842 F.3d at 1311.
185. Id. at 1303.
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bracelet was removed, and the police eventually found the defendant hiding in the home of his girlfriend. 8 6 In the home, police also found a loaded
firearm, ammunition, methamphetamines, and tools and ingredients for
producing methamphetamines.18 7 The defendant was charged with being
a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. 188
Before trial, the government alerted the defendant and the district
court that it planned to introduce evidence of the defendant's prior conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm as evidence of a prior
bad act relevant to the defendant's intent in the current charged crime.18 9
The defendant moved to exclude the evidence because the prior conviction was based on a nolo contendere plea.190 The district court denied the
motion. 191
As a matter of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit, on appeal, the
defendant argued that the district court erred in admitting evidence of
his prior conviction because it was based on a nolo contendere plea, which
failed to provide sufficient proof that it was more likely than not that the
defendant had previously possessed a firearm while a felon. 192 To support
his argument, the defendant relied on two other rules of evidence: Rule
410(a),193 which prohibits the admission of evidence of a nolo contendere
plea; and Rule 803(22),194 which excludes judgments of prior convictions
from the rule against hearsay, unless the conviction was based on a nolo
contendere plea. 195
After a thorough discussion of the issue considering both Eleventh Circuit precedent and out-of-circuit authority, the court found two court of
appeals decisions addressing this precise question. In United States v.
Frederickson,196the Eighth Circuit held the district court did not commit
legal error in admitting the defendant's prior nolo conviction under Rule

186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 1303-04.
189. Id. at 1304.
190. Id. Unlike a guilty plea, which is an admission of each element of the charged crime,
a nolo contendere plea is consent by the defendant that he or she may be punished as though
they were guilty and a request for leniency. Id. at 1317. Nolo pleas typically result in a
judgment of conviction, known as a nolo conviction. Id. at 1312.
191. Id. at 1304.
192. Id. at 1311.
193. FED. R. EVID. 410(a).
194. FED. R. EvID. 803(22).
195. Green, 842 F.3d at 1311.
196. 601 F.2d 1358 (8th Cir. 1979).
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404(b).19 7 The Eighth Circuit determined there was no reason for purposes of evidence of prior bad acts to exclude nolo convictions, but allow
evidence of convictions resulting from guilty pleas or a jury verdict. 198 In
contrast, in United States v. Nguyen, 199 the Ninth Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion. The Ninth Circuit held that, because a conviction
was inevitable following a nolo plea, Federal Rule of Evidence 410's exclusion of nolo contendere pleas would be meaningless if nolo convictions
were not also excluded. 200
Ultimately, the Eleventh Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's outcome,
but not its reasoning. Rather, regarding Rule 410, the Eleventh Circuit
found that it provided an "uncertain basis" for determining the issue because textually it did not address nolo convictions and "implicitly deals
with the inability to use as an admission particular types of pleas or
statements made during a proceeding or plea discussions." 201 Rule
803(22), however, provides that a conviction based on a nolo plea is not
included in the list of convictions which are excluded from the hearsay
rule. 202 Thus, where, as here, the government seeks to admit a nolo con-

viction to show the defendant actually possessed a firearm previously
while a felon, Rule 803(22) precludes the introduction of this evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted. 203 It was therefore error for the
district court to admit the nolo conviction and the government should
have been required to introduce direct evidence supporting the facts of
the prior conviction instead of only presenting the judgment of the conviction. 204

197. Green, 842 F.3d at 1315.
198. Id.
199. 465 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2006).
200. Green, 842 F.3d at 1316.
201. Id. at 1317-18.
202. Id. at 1318.
203. Id. at 1318-19.
204. Id. at 1319. The Eleventh Circuit held, however, that the admission of this evidence
was harmless. There was ample evidence supporting the conviction of the current possession charge without the 404(b) evidence which was used to show intent and lack of mistake.
Also, it was unlikely that the erroneous introduction of this evidence was prejudicial because the defendant stipulated to a prior conviction and the district court provided an appropriate limiting instruction. Id. at 1319-20.

